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1 Introduction
Being in possession of superior technology may give a firm a competitive edge over
rivals, but sometimes the technology owner may voluntarily choose to license it
to rival firms and by doing so reduce its own competitive advantage. A similar
issue arises in industries where some firms own infrastructure that is either essential
or costly to replicate, and where the owners of such infrastructure may choose to
award rival firms access to the infrastructure. We allow the owner of the superior
technology to license its technology to a sub-set of the other firms. All firms but
the one with the superior technology are assumed to be ex ante symmetric. Firms
may still be active in the product market without licensing, but the profitability of
being in the market naturally depends on the number of other firms and the extent
to which licensing is selective. In the present model the technology can be adopted
by the adoptees at no cost other than the license fee; this may be positive, negative
or zero. We use a contest type model, where firms compete for a share of a market
of exogenously given value. There is consequently no added value of licensing on
the demand side, neither through coordination nor through price eﬀects. The eﬀect
of licensing is related to the eﬀect on eﬀort costs, where the R&D undertaken only
aﬀects the distribution of market shares but not the size. This could be thought of
as the case of competing for market shares in a mature market.
The main message from the paper is that foreclosure of a subset of firms may
be the outcome even without restrictions on the licensing schemes. To transfer the
superior technology to a subset of rivals may be used as a tool to foreclose the non-
license takers from the market. We demonstrate that the dominant firm will only
make a transfer of the superior technology if it can be used to foreclose some rival
firms. The reason for this is that active outsiders (i.e., firms that do not obtain
licenses) are a drain on the insiders’ profit. Licensing only occurs if the licensor is
able to foreclose all rival firms but the licensees, and trades are more likely the larger
the number of players at the outset.
To check the robustness of the results, we open for the possibility that the supe-
rior firm can transfer an intermediate quality of technology to rivals (i.e. one that is
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better than the rivals’ initial technology, but not as eﬃcient as the one used by the
dominant actor). The motive to foreclose is so strong that the superior firm would
prefer to make the best technology available since this also forecloses as many rivals
as possible.
The eﬀort undertaken by the participating firms may be interpreted as any type
of innovation or investment that may aﬀect the allocation of market shares among
the firms. The number of potential firms in the industry is exogenously given, but
we investigate the importance of the number of initial firms on both the feasibility
of licensing and the social desirability of such licensing. As such, our focus is similar
to Vilasuso and Frascatore (2000) who consider the alignment of private and soci-
etal incentives in a traditional R&D setting where invention reduces marginal cost
of production. Our analysis is complementary since technology transfer can work
through another channel by aﬀecting the number of competitors.
Shephard (1987) presents a model where the buyers of a new proprietary product
care about both input price and quality, and where licensing may ensure quality com-
petition. Without such quality competition buyers will expect that the seller reduces
quality ex post of the buyers’ purchase decision, which aﬀects demand negatively.
With credible commitment to quality competition there is a demand-enhancing ef-
fect. A similar kind of opportunism eﬀect is discussed in Farrell and Gallini (1988),
where buyers may not want to purchase a product or service which implies set-up
costs if ex post exploitation through high prices is possible. To avoid this, commit-
ment to low future prices may be achieved through licensing at low royalties or as
an open access platform. Conner (1995) analyses the demand eﬀect of cloning (or
transfer of technology) to rival firms in a setting with network externalities, and
shows that such clones may be valuable to the innovating firm. In our setting, we
abstract from the demand eﬀects to focus on the use of licensing as a foreclosure
device.
Katz and Shapiro (1985) analyse a three-stage R&D game with two downstream
firms, and they show that major innovations will not be licensed, but that minor in-
novations may be licensed by equally eﬃcient firms. Although our set-up is diﬀerent
to theirs, we obtain a similar result. To achieve a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
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that involves licensing, the diﬀerence between the superior technology and the tech-
nology available to the other firms cannot be too large. Gallini (1984) considers the
use of licensing in the product market as a strategic device to deter rivals from en-
tering into R&D activity. In the present analysis, the innovation is already realised
and we only consider when and whether licensing can occur. Rockett (1990) demon-
strates how licensing can be used to choose the competitors ("weak" or "strong"),
through changing the rules and conditions of the post-patent entry game. By licens-
ing to weak competitors, the licensor is able to enjoy monopoly rent after the patent
expires by crowding the market. Yi (1998) investigates licensing when potential
licensees diﬀer in the absorptive capacities, and finds that it is optimal to license
exclusively to the strong rival. Erutku and Richelle (2006) consider heterogeneous
firms that may produce diﬀerentiated products, and show a licensor can use non-
linear tariﬀs to extract the full monopoly rent from an invention. Eswaran (1994)
analyses a situation where an incumbent can license its technology to firms that
are currently not active in the market (i.e., without a viable technology) to deter
entry by a potential rival with an alternative technology.1 Licensing its technology
to firms formerly outside the market raises the level of competition, but by using
a combination of royalties and a fixed fee the licensor is able to profitably license
its technology. In the present analysis, all firms have access to a viable technology
and the owner of the superior technology may decide to license to some or all of the
other active firms.
What appears to be surprising in our model compared to the previous literature is
that even without restrictions on licensing schemes there will be foreclosure of a sub-
set of firms. The result is a consequence of the trade-oﬀ between losing competitive
advantage compared to the rivals and capturing license fees. By foreclosing a sub-set
of firms, there are fewer firms that compete for market share.2
Section 2 analyses the case in which only the best available technology can be
1A similar issue is investigated in Yi (1999).
2This motive for voluntary disclosure of information is quite diﬀerent to those often mentioned;
for example, Harhoﬀ et al. (2003) in their review of the relevant literature, cite low values of patent
rights, costs involved in secrecy, and reputation-building as possible motives for freely revealing
details of technology to rivals.
4
transferred, and Section 3 looks at the transfer of technology of intermediate quality.
Section 4 sums up the findings an presents policy implications.
2 The model
There are n+1 firms that compete for a share of a total market of value V . Capturing
market share involves making a sunk investment of some kind; these investments can
have several interpretations such as investments in product promotion or essential
infrastructure. Let firm 0 be in possession of an investment technology that has
marginal cost 1. All other firms j = {1, .., n} have a technology with marginal cost
c > 1. Investments are denoted by bx0 and bxj and are irretrievable. The market
share (m) of a firm is equal to its investment relative to the sum of investments:
m0 =
bx0bx0 +Pns=1 bxs (1)
mj =
bxjbx0 +Pns=1 bxs , j = {1, .., n}
This formulation has been often used in the contest literature, following the
seminal work by Tullock (1980)3. In a market share setting, Bell et al. (1975)
axiomatized functions in (1) where investments were advertising expenditures, and
for a recent application of this framework see Barros and Sørgard (2005).
2.1 Benchmark: No licensing
When each firm uses its initial technology, the expected payoﬀs are given by
bπ0 = bx0Vbx0 +Pns=1 bxs − bx0bπj = bxjVbx0 +Pns=1 bxs − cbxj, j = {1, ..., n}
First-order conditions defining an interior maximum for bx0 and bxj are given by
3For many contest type applications of this function see Konrad (2006).
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Pn
s=1 bxsV
(bx0 +Pns=1 bxs)2 − 1 = 0bx0 +Ps6=j bxsV
(bx0 +Pns=1 bxs)2 − c = 0, j = {1, ..., n}
Equilibrium investments and expected payoﬀs are then easily verified to be
bx∗0 = V n(n(c− 1) + 1)(cn+ 1)2
bx∗j = V n(cn+ 1)2 , j = {1, ..., n}
bπ∗0 = (n(c− 1) + 1)2V(cn+ 1)2 = bx∗0(c− 1 + 1n) (2)
bπ∗j = V(cn+ 1)2 = bx∗jn , j = {1, ..., n} (3)
W ≡ bπ∗0 + nbπ∗j = (n(c− 1) + 1)2V(cn+ 1)2 + n V(cn+ 1)2
where W is total welfare. The form of bπ∗0 emphasizes the two sources of profit that
firm 0 has in this model; profit increases the better 0’s technology compared to
others (∂eπ
∗
0
∂c > 0), and the lower the number of rivals that compete for market share
(∂eπ
∗
0
∂n < 0).
2.1.1 Licensing
Suppose now that firm 0 can sell or license its technology to k ≤ n of the other
firms for a price of t. Hence, with licensing we have k + 1 firms with the new
technology, and n−k without. Denote the set of the k ex ante outsiders with access
to the superior technology by set T and the n− k without as set NT . We assume
that there are no restrictions on the licensing schemes. Although the price t can
be both positive and negative, the licensees in the present model will benefit from
implementing the superior technology and are therefore prepared to pay a positive
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price t > 0.4 The expected payoﬀs of firm 0, j ∈ T, and i ∈ NT are then given by
π0 =
x0V
x0 +
P
s∈T xs +
P
v∈NT xv
− x0 + kt
πj =
xjV
x0 +
P
s∈T xs +
P
v∈NT xv
− xj − t, j ∈ T (4)
πi =
xiV
x0 +
P
s∈T xs +
P
v∈NT xv
− cxi, i ∈ NT
An interior equilibrium for investments is characterized by the following first-
order conditions:
∂π0
∂x0
=
¡P
s∈T xs +
P
v∈NT xv
¢
V¡
x0 +
P
s∈T xs +
P
v∈NT xv
¢2 − 1 = 0
∂πj
∂xj
=
³
x0 +
P
s 6=j∈T xs +
P
v∈NT xv
´
V¡
x0 +
P
s∈T xs +
P
v∈NT xv
¢2 − 1 = 0, j ∈ T (5)
∂πi
∂xi
=
³
x0 +
P
s∈T xs +
P
v 6=i∈NT xv
´
V¡
x0 +
P
s∈T xs +
P
v∈NT xv
¢2 − c = 0, i ∈ NT
The problems that player 0 and each member of T have to solve are identical, as
is the maximisation problem for each i ∈ NT . Posit then that x0 = xj ≡ x ∀ j ∈ T
and xi ≡ y ∀ i ∈ NT . Then (5) can be rewritten as
(kx+ (n− k)y)V
((k + 1)x+ (n− k)y)2
− 1 = 0 (6)
((k + 1)x+ (n− k − 1)y)V
((k + 1)x+ (n− k)y)2
− c = 0, i ∈ NT
From these two equations, the following relative relationship between x and y
emerges:
4Eswaran (1994) argues that firms with technological capabilities of their own may use reverse
engineering on the technology acquired from the licensor to avoid future payment of royalties, and
that this is an argument for selling the technology through a fixed fee payment rather than renting
it out by using royalties.
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x =
(n− k)(c− 1) + 1
1 + k(1− c) y (7)
The numerator in (7) is always positive and the denominator is positive for
1
c− 1 > k (8)
Since an equilibrium involving some transfer of technology in which all n firms
are active has k ≥ 1 we can state the following result immediately.
Proposition 1 There is no interior pure strategy Nash equilibrium involving the
transfer of technology for c > 2, given that all firms are active.
When the less eﬃcient players are at a strong disadvantage (c > 2) it does not
pay for the eﬃcient firm to allow others to become more eﬃcient whilst at the same
time having some players participating that do not pay a licensing fee to firm 0.
2.1.2 Licensing without foreclosure
Suppose now that (8) is fulfilled, i.e., c ∈ (1, 2], so that all firms have positive
investment in equilibrium irrespective of their type of technology; we proceed to
characterize the pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Using (7) in (6) gives the following
equilibrium investments:
x∗ =
V n((n− k)(c− 1) + 1)
((n− k)c+ k + 1)2
(9)
y∗ =
V n(1 + k(1− c))
((n− k)c+ k + 1)2
Inserting (9) into (4) gives the equilibrium expected payoﬀs as
π∗0(n, k) =
V ((n− k)(c− 1) + 1)2
((n− k)c+ k + 1)2
+ tk
π∗j(n, k) =
V ((n− k)(c− 1) + 1)2
((n− k)c+ k + 1)2
− t, j ∈ T (10)
π∗i (n, k) =
V ((k(c− 1)− 1)2
((n− k)c+ k + 1)2
, i ∈ NT
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Sale of the more eﬃcient technology is profitable for 0 if π∗0 ≥ bπ∗0, and those who
are oﬀered the new technology wish to buy as long as π∗j ≥ bπ∗j from (3).
Technology sharing through licensing agreements is said to be feasible if such
an agreement is in the interest of both the licensor and the licensees. In order to
look at the feasibility of licensing agreements, consider the payoﬀ of the group of
"insiders", i.e. firms that have the best technology consisting of firm 0 and j ∈ T .
The aggregate profit of this group increases after technology transfer if
π∗0(n, k) + kπ
∗
j(n, k) > bπ∗0 + kbπ∗j (11)
since the licensing fee is just an internal transfer within the group. Without
considering the licensing fee, it is easy to verify that 0 gets a lower payoﬀ following
technology transfer, and the other insiders experience an increase. The licensor will
not accept to share its technology without side payment, and the licensees are willing
to pay a positive price for access to the technology, which implies that feasibility
requires a transfer to the licensor.
If (11) is satisfied, it is possible to compensate firm 0 adequately for the reduction
in expected payoﬀ. Using (10), (2) and (3), (11) is satisfied as long as
n ≥ k > 2 (cn+ 1) (−n+ cn+ 1)
(c− 1) (n(2c− 1) + 2) (12)
A necessary condition for this to hold is that the interval is defined, i.e.
n− 2 (cn+ 1) (−n+ cn+ 1)
(c− 1) (n(2c− 1) + 2) > 0⇒
−(n2(c− 1) + 2(1 + cn))
(c− 1) (n(2c− 1) + 2) > 0
which clearly cannot hold since (n2(c−1)+2(1+cn)) > 0 and (c− 1) (n(2c− 1) + 2) >
0 since c > 1.
Hence we see that (12) cannot be satisfied. This means that by selling licences
to k firms, while the remaining n− k firms are still active in the market, leads to a
reduction in the total profit of the insiders. Hence, we have the following result:
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Proposition 2 There is no feasible licensing agreement involving the transfer of
the superior technology to k firms given that the n− k firms are active.
2.1.3 Licensing with foreclosure
Allowing non-license takers to remain active is a drain on the profits of the insider
group. Assume then that k is set so that y∗ = 0, i.e.
n > k ≥ 1
c− 1 (13)
Note that there are now only k + 1 players in total (0 and the k licensees).
This means that the expressions in (9) have to be adjusted accordingly by setting
y∗ = 0 and n = k in x∗ so that the amount of investment in the pure strategy Nash
equilibrium is:
xf =
k
(1 + k)2
V
with expected total payoﬀs to the group of k + 1 insiders
Πf =
V
k + 1
(14)
with each insider earning πf = V
(k+1)2
− t and firm 0 earning πf0 = V(k+1)2 + tk.
Given that (13) is fulfilled, trade of licenses either at a positive or negative price is
now feasible if total payoﬀs to the insiders (Firm 0 and the k licensees) are higher
with than without license transfer:
∆Π = Πf −
¡bπ∗0 + kbπ∗j¢ ≥ 0 (15)
Feasibility of trade in licenses at a positive price requires that πf > bπ∗j for each
of the k insider firms, which is always satisfied since cn > k.
Given that ∆Π ≥ 0, firm 0 will choose the number of licenses, k, to make Πf
as large as possible in relation to the outside option of the licensees (kbπ∗j). This
would imply that the total value added of licensing with foreclosure is maximised.
Without any restrictions on the price structure or price level, a transfer payment
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between the licensees and the licensor can be set up to allow the licensor to capture
the value added. Hence, firm 0 sets k that maximizes the following
Πf0 = Π
f − kbπ∗j = V(k + 1) − k V(cn+ 1)2 (16)
Since Πf0 is decreasing in k, the lowest value of this parameter will be chosen,
given that the foreclosure condition in (13) holds. Hence, firm 0 will set kf = 1c−1
to achieve foreclosure of the n − k firms. Inserting kf into (15), trade is feasible,
(∆Π ≥ 0), as long as
n2c(c− 1)2 + 1− 2c > 0 (17)
We need also that n > kf = 1c−1 . It is easily verified that this is true when (17)
is satisfied. From (17) we see that trades are more likely to be feasible the larger is
n. Solving (17) delineates feasible trades, and we define nf as the critical level of n
that ensures feasible trades:
n > nf =
s
2c− 1
c(c− 1)2 (18)
Consequently, the larger is the number of potential firms, n, the more likely is
the feasibility of trade in licenses. It is straightforward to show that the critical
level of nf is lower the higher is the marginal cost of eﬀort for the outsiders, since
∂nf/∂c < 0 for c ∈ (1, 2]
∂nf
∂c
= − (4c
2 − 3c+ 1)
2c2(c− 1)3
q
2c−1
c(c−1)2
< 0
11
21.751.51.25
15
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10
7.5
5
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c
n, k
Figure: Foreclosure level kf and the feasibility requirement nf : nf (thin line), kf
(thick line) for n ≥ 2
For the sake of the argument, we concentrate on n ≥ 2, so that at least one firm
will be foreclosed. When c approaches 2, nf approaches 1
2
√
6 < 2, such that trades
will always be feasible. From (18) we find that nf = 2 if c ≈ 1. 59. Consequently, if
c ∈ (1. 59, 2], trade is feasible for all n ≥ 2. In contrast, when c approaches 1, trades
will not be feasible.
We thus state the following result:
Proposition 3 Licensing to k firms in order to foreclose the n− k firms from the
market increases the total expected payoﬀs to the insiders as long as n > nf , where
nf is decreasing in c.
While trades are feasible when (15) is fulfilled, the condition that ensures that
trade increases welfare is given by
∆W = Πf −
¡bπ∗0 + nbπ∗j¢ ≥ 0 (19)
Since n > k, as long as n > nf , it follows that ∆W ≥ 0 is a stronger condition
than ∆Π ≥ 0. Thus, the set of outcomes that involves feasibility of licensing is
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larger than the set of outcomes that is socially desirable. We insert for kf into (14),
and total expected payoﬀs to the insiders in the foreclosure case becomes:
Πf(kf) =
V (c− 1)
c
The condition that ensures that foreclosure increases welfare (19) may then be
rewritten as
∆W =
V (c− 1)
c
−
µ
V (n2 (c2 − 2c+ 1) + n (2c− 1) + 1)
(cn+ 1)2
¶
=
V (c2n2 − cn2 − cn− 1)
(cn+ 1)2 c
≥ 0
It is easily verified that ∆W is an increasing function of n. Hence we can define nw
as the critical level of n that ensures that welfare increases:
nw ≡ 1
2c (c− 1)
³
c+
p
c (5c− 4)
´
with welfare increasing for n > nw.
Comparing the two critical levels of n, nf and nw, we first of all observe that
nw is strictly larger than nf for all permissible parameter values. This implies that
there are combinations of (n, c) such that license trading is feasible (with n > nf),
but where such trade is detrimental to welfare (with n < nw). This is the area
between the solid and dashed line in the figure below. As we observe from the fig-
ure, the area exists albeit not for a substantial set of parameter values. For most
of the combinations of the parameters (n, c), feasible trade would also be welfare
enhancing.
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Figure: Feasible versus welfare enhancing trade (nw thin line, nf thick line),
n ≥ 2
We also need to check that n > kf ≡ 1c−1 , or since nw > nf that n > max
©
kf , nf
ª
which is trivially satisfied for c > 1:
nf − kf =
s
2c− 1
c(c− 1)2 −
1
c− 1
=
1
(c− 1)
Ãr
2c− 1
c
− 1
!
> 0 for c ∈ (1, 2]
It is straightforward to show ∂∆W/∂c > 0 and ∂∆W/∂n > 0 for c ∈ (1, 2].
Hence welfare will increase most the more disadvantaged the rivals to 0, and the
larger their initial number. Moreover, we have that ∆W > 0 when c approaches 2,
while ∆W < 0 when c approaches 1.
3 Licensing of inferior technologies
To check the robustness of the results of the previous section, we now consider
whether firm 0 may benefit from transferring technology that is better than rivals
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have at the outset but that is not as eﬃcient as the one used by firm 0. One may
interpret this as transferring a technology of an intermediate quality, where quality
becomes a choice variable for firm 0. Let us assume that k firms are allowed to
acquire the technology a, where a ∈ [1, c], and n−k still have the technology c. The
first-order conditions are now given by:
∂π0
∂x0
=
¡P
s∈T xs +
P
v∈NT xv
¢
V¡
x0 +
P
s∈T xs +
P
v∈NT xv
¢2 − 1 = 0
∂πj
∂xj
=
³
x0 +
P
s 6=j∈T xs +
P
v∈NT xv
´
V¡
x0 +
P
s∈T xs +
P
v∈NT xv
¢2 − a = 0, j ∈ T (20)
∂πi
∂xi
=
³
x0 +
P
s∈T xs +
P
v 6=i∈NT xv
´
V¡
x0 +
P
s∈T xs +
P
v∈NT xv
¢2 − c = 0, i ∈ NT
Then we have the following equilibrium investments for each firm type (0, T ,
NT ):
x0(a) =
(cn− ck − n+ ka+ 1)V n
(cn− ck + ka+ 1)2
xT (a) =
(cn− ck + ka− na+ 1)V n
(cn− ck + ka+ 1)2
(21)
xNT (a) =
(k (a− c) + 1)V n
(cn− ck + ka+ 1)2
From xNT we have that if k ≥ 1c−a , then n − k are driven out of the market.
Bearing in mind that outsiders just drain resources away from firm 0 and its potential
customers, let us assume that this is the case, so that the investment levels in (21)
have to be rewritten for the fact that the number of competitors to firm 0 is k = n.
Hence equilibrium investments are
xf0(a) =
(1 + k(a− 1)) k
(1 + ka)2
V
xfT (a) =
k
(1 + ka)2
V
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with corresponding expected payoﬀs:
πf0(a) = V
(k(a− 1) + 1)2
(ka+ 1)2
πfT (a) = V
k(a− 1) + 1
(ka+ 1)2
Aggregate payoﬀs of active firms is then
Πf(a) = πf0(a) + kπ
f
T (a) = V
k(a− 1) + 1
ka+ 1
which is strictly increasing in a and strictly decreasing in k. The maximum that
firm 0 can increase its payoﬀ compared to the outset will be the excess of aggregate
payoﬀs over the k insiders’ outside options given by V
(cn+1)2 (from (3)). Then, firm
0 maximizes Πf0(a) = Π
f(a)− k V
(cn+1)2 by choice of k and a. The level of k will be
set as low as possible, or a as large as possible. However a = c does not represent
a transfer of technology so we consider setting k at the lowest level commensurate
with foreclosure: denote this by kf(a) = 1c−a . Inserting k
f(a) into Πf(a) gives
Πf(kf(a)) =
V (c− 1)
c
where πf0(k
f(a)) = V (c−1)
2
c2 and π
f
T (k
f(a)) = V (c−1)(c−a)c2
Total expected payoﬀs of the insiders Πf(kf(a)) are independent of a. Thus, one
has the policy implication that, as long as trades are feasible, welfare is independent
of the level of a ∈ [1, c), i.e. the quality of the transferred technology does not aﬀect
total welfare. However, from Πf0(a) =
V (c−1)
c − k
V
(cn+1)2 we see that firm 0 prefers to
set a = 1 since kf(a > 1) > kf(a = 1).
Proposition 4 Firm 0 will set a as low as possible such that a = 1, giving k = 1c−1 .
The outcome is identical to Proposition 3, and trades will be feasible as long as
n > nf is satisfied.
The dominant firm faces a trade oﬀ in its choice of technology quality to transfer
to rivals. Better quality means stronger competition from firms that have the new
technology, but at the same time it allows foreclosure of more of the rival firms. The
latter eﬀect dominates here.
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4 Concluding remarks
This paper has analysed a situation in which a dominant technological leader com-
petes with rivals for shares of a market of fixed size. The dominant firm derives
increased profits from being technologically superior, and if it can force some rivals
out of the market. We consider the interconnection between these forces by allow-
ing the technology to be licensed to some rivals in order to foreclose others. Due to
the fixed size of the market, some degree of foreclosure is necessary to make license
payments feasible. Selective or exclusive licensing is an accepted mode of transfer-
ring intellectual property rights between firms as outlined by the US Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in the Antitrust Guidelines for Licensing
Intellectual Property from 1995.5 Hence some degree of foreclosure will not be ruled
out a priori by law.
On the other hand, to the extent that the transferred technology guarantees
access to an essential input, competition authorities may adopt a policy of no dis-
crimination. Under the competition laws in the United States and the EU the
essential-facilities doctrine may apply towards dominating firms which control a
bottleneck, and a dominating firm may be obligated to provide access to rivals at
non-discriminatory terms (see e.g. Bergman, 2001). Moreover, in regulated indus-
tries like telecommunications, obligations which require that the incumbent provides
access at non-discriminatory terms are part of the current regulatory regimes both
in the United States and the EU. If such non-discriminatory obligations are present,
welfare-enhancing licensing of technology may be precluded.
We have also considered the possibility that the dominant firm can choose to
license an inferior version of its technology to rivals, and we have found that the
total profit of the active firms will be independent of the quality of the licensed
technology. However, the desire to foreclose as many rivals as possible is so strong
that the dominant firm chooses to transfer the best quality of technology to as few
competitors as possible, given the restrictions on the feasibility of trade (i.e. that
trade benefits both buyer and seller).
5See the discussion in Scotchmer (2004), chapter 6.
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